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CONFRONTING THE RIGHTS DEFICIT AT HOME:

IS THE

NATION PREPARED IN THE AFTERMATH OF KATRINA?
CONFRONTING THE MYTH OF EFFICIENCY*

MARIA ISABEL MEDINA"

I want to extend my thanks to Ruben Garcia and Laura Padilla for
organizing this conference and to Ruben and Andrea Johnson, in
particular, for asking me to participate in this panel. I am going to
address you today, primarily, as a person who has been affected by
Katrina. To an extent, I am going to take off my law professor hat,
but only to an extent, because I must make clear at the outset that I am
not the typical Katrina refugee-I am one of those with resources that
most persons affected by Katrina lacked. I am also one of those
whose house, for the most part, survived-even though, for a time, it
too bore one of the dreaded red stickers the students talked about
yesterday.' I am one of those whose employer, Loyola University
These remarks were delivered at the Western Law Professors
of Color
Conference held at California Western School of Law in San Diego on April 1,
2006. The panel, Confronting the Rights Deficit at Home: Is the Nation Prepared in
the Aftermath of Katrina?, was organized and moderated by Professor Andrea
Johnson, California Western School of Law, and featured Barbara Arnwine,
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; Richard Skinner, Inspector
General, Department of Homeland Security; and Sharon Robinson, Inspector
General, State of Louisiana.
Ferris Family Professor of Law, Loyola University New Orleans College
of
Law; Visiting Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law, Spring 2006.
1. Panel presentation at the Western Law Professors of Color Conference at
California Western School of Law (Mar. 31, 2006). The Conference opened with a
special presentation by University of California, Los Angeles students, who had
traveled to the area affected by Hurricane Katrina, titled Critical Race Praxis:
Reports on Race, Rights and Reconstructionfrom the Gulf Coast, moderated by Saul
Sarabia, University of California, Los Angeles. The students described their work in
the Gulf Coast area, including assistance provided to a legal challenge to the city of
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New Orleans College of Law, although similarly displaced, managed
to keep its systems working and not miss a payroll.
This panel confronts the question: Is the nation prepared in the

New Orleans' decision to demolish homes without sufficient notice to homeowners.
The red sticker refers to the red or bright orange notices placed on homes that initial
city or FEMA inspections had determined were unsafe to inhabit. Id.
2. See Kevin W. Wildes, After Katrina: Two Presidents Reflect, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Apr. 21, 2006, at B12 (Loyola President describing
his decision to keep salaries going despite the University's closure). Many persons
had an almost immediate loss of income because their employer lost its business or
was not able to get back up quickly, and so might have suffered payroll
interruptions. The unemployment rate in Louisiana went from 5.6% in August 2005
to 12.1% in September 2005. S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & Gov'T AFFAIRS,
109TH CONG., HURRICANE KATRINA: A NATION STILL UNPREPARED 2-1 (2006)
[hereinafter
SENATE
REPORT],
available
at
http://hsgac.senate.gov/
files/Katrina/FullReport.pdf. Education at all levels was hit hard. For example,
universities like Dillard University and Xavier University terminated a number of
tenured faculty almost immediately. See April Capochino, Many N.O. Universities
Forced to Slash Positions, NEW ORLEANS CITY Bus., Nov. 21, 2005,
http://www.neworleanscitybusiness.com/viewFeature.cfin?reclD= 137;
April
Capochino, Colleges Downsize Staffs To Save Money, NEW ORLEANS CITY Bus.,
Nov. 21, 2005, at 8, available at http://www.neworleanscitybusiness.com/
viewStory.cfm?reclD=13975; Katherine S. Mangan, 2 Colleges Hit by Katrina Cut

Their Staffs by over Half CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Nov. 11, 2005, at
Al; Coleman Warner, Xavier Slashes Jobs in Wake of Katrina, TIMES-PICAYUNE
(New Orleans), Oct. 29, 2005, Metro, at 1. Subsequently, Tulane University cut
academic programs, terminated tenured faculty, and terminated a number of staff
positions. Michael Janofsky, Lean Tulane To Reopen Its Campus Next Month, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 9, 2005, at A 18. Loyola University also cut programs, tenured faculty,
and staff at the end of the 2005-2006 academic year. Piper Fogg, Eric Hoover &
Katherine S. Mangan, Students Return to Campuses That Are Forever Changed,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Jan. 20, 2006, at A20; Piper Fogg, Storm
Surge: Professors at Loyola U. New Orleans Thought They Had Dodged Katrina.
They Thought Wrong, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), July 7, 2006, at A10.
All institutions are the subject of an American Association of University Professors
investigation. Piper Fogg, New Orleans College Presidents Decline To Meet With
AAUP Over Layoffs, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Sept. 1, 2006, at A22;
Andrew Mytelka, New Orleans Colleges Meet With AA UP, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.
(Wash., D.C.), Sept. 8, 2006, at A9. A few days after the hurricane closed the
school's operations, Loyola's law school accepted a generous offer by the
University of Houston Law Center to continue its fall semester at Houston's facility,
and law students who chose to attend were able to complete their fall studies with
Loyola in Houston. HurricaneKatrina: Colleges Pay Most Workers-If They Can

Be Found,CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Sept. 23, 2005, at Al0.
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aftermath of Hurricane Katrina? That question contains another
question: Prepared for what? Another hurricane? A terrorist attack?
An outbreak of a deadly virus? An earthquake? I can tell you how
the people of New Orleans would answer the question: prepared for
another hurricane at some point during this coming hurricane season?
And I can tell you how they would answer, then, the original question.
Katrina and her aftermath raise serious questions about two issueshow the United States deals with its poor and whether its
governmental institutions are as capable and efficient as we have
tended to believe they are.
Natural disasters as a rule do not discriminate on the basis of race,
color, gender, or wealth, and Katrina, in this regard, was no different
from most natural disasters. The surge of water brought by the storm
together with, apparently, faulty design and construction of the levees
built to protect the greater metropolitan New Orleans area3 resulted in
a number of breaches along the Industrial Canal levee, which flooded
the Ninth Ward, a predominantly poor, black area of the city, St.
Bernard Parish, a predominantly white area, and New Orleans East.4
Breaches at the 17th Street Canal and the London Avenue Canal
flooded and devastated predominantly white, middle-class, and
wealthy parts of the city-the Lakeview area, parts of Old Metairie,
and parts of uptown New Orleans, including Tulane University-as
well as financially, racially, and ethnically diverse areas of the city
like Broadmoor, Gentilly, and Mid-City.5 The devastation that the
storm visited on the city left thousands of persons of all races, ethnic
backgrounds, financial status, class, and ages without homes, in some
6
cases temporarily, and in many others, permanently.

3.

SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 4-4 to 4-7.

4. Id. at 4-5. For narrative accounts by survivors of the effect of the hurricane
as it struck the area, see id. at 1-3 to 1-14. See also

DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE
GREAT DELUGE: HURRICANE KATRINA, NEW ORLEANS, AND THE MISSISSIPPI GULF
COAST (2006); JED HORNE, BREACH OF FAITH: HURRICANE KATRINA AND THE NEAR
DEATH OF A GREAT AMERICAN CITY (2006).

5. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 4-6; Brenda Lloyd, New Orleans
Rebuilds, Rebounds, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Aug. 21, 2006, Metro, at 3;
see also Ivor L. van Heerden et al., Initial Assessment of the New Orleans Flooding
Event During the Passage of Hurricane Katrina (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
6. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 2-1.
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As of March 20, 2006, 1464 deaths in Louisiana have been
attributed to Katrina.7 At least 300,000 homes were destroyed or
rendered uninhabitable.' One hundred eighteen million cubic yards of
debris are estimated to have been created by Katrina.9 Losses are
estimated at $125-150 billion.'
The students in the opening session referred to the disconnect in
the New Orleans community between how poor blacks have been
treated or the resources they have had access to, and the more affluent
white or black New Orleans community."
To some extent, the
disconnect reflects a racial divide; at least, that is how national media
have depicted it.12 The disconnect, however, is of grander scope and
bears not just on race, but, ultimately, on wealth. In every major
metropolitan American area, there is a community that is
impoverished; in New Orleans, its face is primarily black, although
there are many white, Vietnamese, and Latino poor in New Orleans as
well. 13 These are communities that had been forgotten in New
Orleans long before Katrina made landfall. These communities had
been forgotten by a city government that is bi-racial, headed by Mayor
Ray Nagin, an African-American ex-businessman elected to his first
political office in 2002 who pledged to clean up the corrupt political
culture of New Orleans, and a city council,14 which has been
predominantly African-American for two decades.

7. Louisiana Dep't of Health & Hosps., Hurricane Katrina Deceased Reports
(Aug. 2, 2006), http://www.dhh.louisiana.gov/offices/page.asp?ID=192&Detail=

5248.
8. SENATE
9. Id.

REPORT,

supra note 2, at 2-1.

10. Id.at2-1,2-2.
11. See supra note 1.
12. See, e.g., Live Benefit Includes Appeals-And Unscripted Criticism, USA
TODAY, Sept. 3, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/life/people/2005-09-03-kanyewest x.htm.
13. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 12
tbl.10 (2006), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/population/
pop.pdf.
14. City of New Orleans, http://www.cityofno.com (last visited Nov. 9, 2006);
see also JOHN MCQUAID & MARK SCHLEIFSTEIN, PATH OF DESTRUCTION: THE
DEVASTATION OF NEW ORLEANS AND THE COMING AGE OF SUPERSTORMS 142-44
(2006).
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These are communities that lack the resources to prepare
adequately for a disaster; to evacuate; to maintain themselves in a
different location after having had to abandon their home and all their
possessions for a lengthy period of time; to return home, not once but
many times, to arrange for repairs, rebuilding, reconstruction; and to
deal with insurance companies, mortgage companies, creditors,
schools, and the myriad of institutions that persons who have had to
abandon homes for a lengthy period of time have to do. We saw the
face of this community in New Orleans on national television the first
week of September last year. But this is a community that exists in
Houston, Miami, New York, Chicago, Minneapolis, Kansas City,
Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, and San Diego. We have ignored
these communities to our peril, and Katrina should have made us sit
up and take notice.
The nation, as a whole, is suffering a complete disconnect
between the reality of Katrina and what Katrina should have made us
realize. No, we are not prepared in the aftermath of Katrina. We are
not adequately prepared to face, deal with, and recover from a major
disaster, whether natural or man-made. The lessons we should have
learned, or thought we had learned, from the failure of our systems on
9/11, have not been implemented, and it appears unlikely that the
massive failure of government at all levels that Katrina represents will
not visit us again. Many of the governmental failures identified in the
response to 9/11 -failures
of communications,
leadership,
collaboration between agencies and planning-played a role again in
the governmental responses to Katrina. Moreover, Katrina was no
surprise-the likelihood that a storm much more devastating than
Katrina would strike the New Orleans area had been predicted and
discussed in the New Orleans media for some time before Katrina
hit.15
Let me tell you a story. It is a story about citizens and refugees,
of the national and international variety, and a story about hurricanes,
always good for color and drama. It is a story about three hurricanes.
Take a step back in history. It is night on September 9, 1965, and

15. Washing Away, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), June 23-27, 2002,
available at http://www.nola.com/hurricane/?/washingaway/.
In fact, FEMA had

staged a practice hurricane event with state and city officials entitled "Hurricane
Pam" only the previous year. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 8-1 to 8-9.
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Hurricane Betsy, a category four hurricane when it hits Grand Isle, the
lowest point on the Louisiana Gulf Coast, hits New Orleans as 16a
category three hurricane, packing winds of 125 miles per hour.
Betsy drove a storm surge into Lake Pontchartrain that flooded parts
of the Lower and Upper Ninth Ward, and Arabi and Chalmette, lowlying areas beneath the city.' 7
I remember Betsy. I was a child at the time, and my family lived
in the Iberville federal housing projects in downtown New Orleans.
We were not U.S. citizens-we were immigrants, refugees from Cuba,
who had settled in New Orleans in late 1961. I arrived as a student on
July 21, 1961, and at some point in time was reclassified as a refugee.
Subsequently, I adjusted to the status of permanent resident alien. I
imagine that for some period of time I might have been illegal,
although Congress was very generous with Cubans and cured any
illegality of this early crop of Cuban immigrants fairly quickly.
The point is we were poor. My father had just arrived from Cuba.
We had a rickety old car that might have made it out of the city, but
no one was willing to try. We had no resources to speak of-we were
on government aid, although my parents worked. I remember there
was talk of evacuation but it did not include us. And so we stayed. I
remember not sleeping that night until the worst of the hurricane was
over. The miracle was those projects came through unscathed. We
did not evacuate, and I suspect most of the other inhabitants of the
projects did not either. 18 Not because we weren't scared. Not because
we didn't want to. Simply because we couldn't.
16. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 6-1.
17. Craig E. Colten, From Betsy to Katrina: Shifting Policies, Lingering
Vulnerabilities, presented at MaGrann Research Conference (Apr. 2006)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://geography.rutgers.edu/
events/magrann_conference/2006/-papers/colten.pdf;
see David Snyder, Great
Flood Surge Came Many Ways, NEW ORLEANS STATES-ITEM, Sept. 13, 1965, at 1.
One of the lessons we have learned from Katrina is the difference forty years of
coastal erosion and wetlands loss makes to Louisiana's ability to weather storms.
Were a storm like Betsy to hit today, damage would be much more severe.
18. The mayor of New Orleans at the time, Victor Schiro, did not call for a
mandatory evacuation of the city. See MCQUAID & SCHLEIFSTEIN, supra note 14, at
55-58. Few people, in fact, appear to have evacuated. Id. There was little advance
warning of the hurricane, however, and it was still common practice to open
emergency shelters within the city. See Jack Wardlaw, HurricaneMoving To Strike
Southwest La. Coast Tonight, NEW ORLEANS STATES-ITEM, Sept. 9, 1965, at 1.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol43/iss1/3

6

Medina: Confronting the Rights Deficit at Home: Is the Nation Prepared in

2006]

CONFRONTING THE RIGHTS DEFICIT AT HOME

But I remember seeing the waters high on Elysian Fields in the
city. I have never forgotten the sight. It took ten days to drain the city
in 1965.19 At least seventy-five people died.20 At the time, Betsy was
the costliest hurricane in the history of the United States. 2' It was
Betsy that prompted Congress to authorize a ring of levees around the
city to protect it from future storms.22 These are the same levees that
failed when Katrina hit.
Flash-forward to another September, this time in 1998, and
another hurricane, Georges, appears headed toward the city.23 I am a
law professor now and live in uptown New Orleans, the section of the
city where two universities are, including Loyola. I'm no longer an
alien or refugee in 1998. I'm a citizen. In some ways, I fit the classic
first generation immigrant mold. In my youth, I completely accepted
Upon reaching the age of eighteen, I
the American dream.
So in 1998 and in 2005 I am a citizen.
citizen.
a
naturalized-became
But my mother is not a citizen. She has been plagued by ill health all
her life-she has never desired to, nor gone through, the process of
naturalization.
I live in an area that is considered at risk for flooding, but my
house, raised approximately three to four feet from the ground has,
apparently, never flooded. As far as I'm concerned, though, the whole
city is a potential flood risk, sandwiched in as it is between the waters
of Lake Pontchartrain and the great Mississippi, a few blocks away
from my home. Georges is not a huge, bad storm. I know my home
made it through Betsy, and I decide this time to ride the storm out.
19. See Jack Wardlaw, City Near Victory in Flooding Battle, NEW ORLEANS
STATES-ITEM, Sept. 16, 1965, at 1.
20. See Colten, supra note 17, at 2.
21. HurricaneBetsy Disaster of September 1965: HearingsBefore the Special
Subcomm. to Investigate Areas of Destruction of HurricaneBetsy of the H. Comm.
on Public Works, 89th Cong. 7 (1965); see also HORNE, supra note 4, at 20-21.
22. Flood Control Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-298, § 204, 79 Stat. 1073, 1077;
see Army Corps of Engineers, Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane
Protection Project: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Water
Development of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 109th Cong. 1 (2005) (Statement
of Anu Mittal, Director Natural Resources and Environment), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d051050t.pdf.
23. Hurricane Georges: The Day After, TIMES-PICAYUINE (New Orleans), Sept.

29,

1998,

http://www.nola.com/hurricane/index.ssf?/weather/georges/index.html;

see HORNE, supra note 4, at 15.
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My extended family gathers in my home, as we decide it is the house
most likely to survive the storm. We are all counting that it will not
be a direct hit. And we are right-Georges veers off to the east and
hits Biloxi, a town in Mississippi on the Gulf Coast.24 That night I
gather my two boys on my bed and try to get them to sleep. The
house shakes the entire night. Though it is not a direct hit, Georges
leaves New Orleans with damage." The next morning we are uptrees and electrical wires are down, including a huge branch off my
over 100 year old elm tree in my backyard, which comes down across
the street and manages to spare any of the houses on the other side.
Traffic signals are out; power is out; and telephone service is out.
Mayor Marc Morial declares a curfew almost immediately, as reports
of looting and fires start to come through.26 Mayor Morial used the
Superdome as an evacuation center, and those people are not allowed
out after the storm because of the curfew. 27 "'I don't feel safe in here.
I don't want to stay another night.' . . . 'I would have taken my
chances with the water if I knew it'd be like this. I should have never
come to this dump,"' one of the residents kept inside the dome is
28
quoted as saying in the Times-Picayune the next day.
It is days before power is restored for some in the community, and
days before the trees are cleared. For the first time, I become
cognizant of the fact that it is not just the actual storm that is to be
feared, but its aftermath. I resolve that I will never ride out another
hurricane of any strength in the city. From now on, we evacuate.
Fast forward now to August 27, 2005, the day that the New
Orleans community first hears that Katrina may be headed our way. I
don't hear about it until that night when a neighbor calls me with the
news. I go to sleep hoping that its track veers overnight. We have
24. HORNE, supra note 4, at 15.
25. See John McQuaid & Mark Schleifstein, The Big One: A Major Hurricane
Could Decimate the Region, but Floodingfrom Even a Moderate Storm Could Kill
Thousands, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), June 24, 2002, National, at 1; Steve
Ritea, Lingering Aftermath: Many Georges Victims Not Home for Holidays, TIMESPICAYUNE (New Orleans), Dec. 27, 1998, Metro, at 1.
26. James Vamey, Curfew Traps Thousands in City Shelters, TIMES-PICAYUNE
(New
Orleans),
Sept.
29,
1998
http://www.nola.com/weather/georges/
tpm092998h.html.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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already evacuated once during the summer of 2005, and we really
don't want to have to do it again. 29 But Saturday morning all of the
computer models have it heading our way and it's looking like it could
be a direct hit. It takes me most of the day to find a hotel that would
take the animals, and arrange for this second evacuation, and it is not
until three in the afternoon that we find ourselves on the interstate
headed, this time, to Little Rock, Arkansas. I am comforted the next
day to hear that the President has promised all of the assistance we
will need.3° He has already acted, I think; we are safe. Everyone is on
top of this one, I think. I am afraid of what lies ahead for my city, but
I trust in the levels of government we have-city, state and federal.
Traditionally, local government is primarily responsible for
evacuations and first responses to a natural disaster. The National
Weather Service predicted that Hurricane Katrina would be a direct hit
to the New Orleans area at least by Saturday, August 27, at 7:30 a.m.
At 1 p.m., Mayor Ray Nagin declared a state of emergency and stated
he would issue a voluntary evacuation order. He also indicated that
the Superdome would be open as a shelter of last resort. The mayor
did not order a mandatory evacuation order until 9:30 a.m. the next
morning, after repeated urgings by Max Mayfield, Director of the
National Hurricane Center. 31 But the city was not ready to execute a
mandatory evacuation order, and there was no plan for transporting
the many who had no transportation out of the city and could not
32
afford several days stay in a hotel.
I am disturbed by the fact that it has taken our mayor a long time
to declare a mandatory evacuation. I am disturbed that once again we
are telling people to go to the Superdome. 33 I don't understand why
we are not evacuating the poor-those who cannot afford to evacuate
29. Hurricane Dennis threatened the New Orleans area in July 2005. See Bruce
Nolan, The Decision To Evacuate Doesn't Come Easily, TIMES-PICAYuNE (New
Orleans), July 9, 2005, National, at 1; MCQUAID & SCHLEIFSTEIN, supra note 14, at
156-57.
30. Press Release, The White House, President George W. Bush, Statement on
Federal Emergency Assistance for Louisiana (Aug. 27, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050827-1 .html.
31. MCQUAID & SCHLEIFSTEIN, supra note 14, at 165, 171-77.
32. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 1-4, 1-5.
33. See Mark Schleifstein, Morial, State Dispute Dome as Shelter, TIMESPICAYUNE (New Orleans), June 2, 1999, Metro, at 2.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2006

9

California Western Law Review, Vol. 43 [2006], No. 1, Art. 3

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

on their own. I am disgusted when I see our sheriff saying that we are
not going to evacuate the prisons.34 We know better. Or do we?
After Hurricane Georges, the Times-Picayune did a four-part
series on hurricane response. Among the issues covered were the
necessity to evacuate, the problems that a massive evacuation of the
New Orleans area posed, the fact that many residents of this poor city
could not evacuate on their own, and the fact that serious doubts
existed as to whether the levees (any levee) could prevent serious
flooding in the case of a direct hit by a serious storm.3 5
We have now poured millions, I think, into studies, investigations,
and reports-but we knew-we knew way in advance what,
potentially, was headed our way.3 6 But even on Sunday, I feel
somewhat secure. The federal government is behind us, I think. I
know my city is a dysfunctional city-like many other American
cities.
Our infrastructure is weak-troubled by incompetence,
corruption and political infighting. But I'm comforted because I still
believe in the myth you see. 9/11 did some damage to the myth-but
I know we've all been busy coming up with disaster plans and we've
studied emergency response as it's never been studied before. I think
we are going to do better this time, because we have advance noticenot too much advance notice, but some. And we have expertise in
reconstruction, don't we? We helped to reconstruct Japan, Germany,
and now Iraq?
If people come down to build houses and restore power,
telephone, and cable service to communities in New Orleans, and the
rest of the Gulf Coast communities devastated by Katrina, I think we
can guarantee that for the most part they won't be bombed, fired upon,
or be subjected to harassment.
What do we need? We need houses. We need stop lights that
34. See Gordon Russell, Nagin Orders First-Ever Mandatory Evacuation of
New Orleans, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Aug. 28, 2005, http://www.
nola.com/katrina/updates/index.ssf?/mtlogs/nolaTimesPicayune/archives/2005 08
28.html.
35. Washing Away, supra note 15.
36. In 2004, FEMA conducted, with Louisiana and New Orleans officials, a
week-long simulation of a category three hurricane hitting the New Orleans area,
Hurricane Pam. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 4-5; BRINKLEY, supra note 4,
at 18-19; HORNE, supra note 4, at 51, 147; MCQUAID & SCHLEIFSTEIN, supra note
14, at 138-40.
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work. We need power, cable, and telephone service. We need
garbage pickup. We need schools that do not reek of mold and that
offer basic educational competence to our students. We need mail
service. We need competent law enforcement that doesn't pose the
same kind of risk to residents that criminals do. We need to move
beyond the racial and ethnic divide that has too often driven city, state,
and national politics.
When the media referred to the Katrina evacuees as "refugees,"
there was an outcry in the African-American community. Critics
complained evacuees were citizens, not "refugees" or "aliens" and,
thus, entitled to better treatment than they received at the hands of the
government.37 This is not the first time writers, legislators, or the
media have referred to hurricane or disaster victims as "refugees. 38
Persons affected by Hurricane Betsy, the Mississippi River valley
floods of 39
1927, and other natural disasters were referred to as
"refugees.,
The term is a legal term of art under international and
federal law, but it is also a term that in the common vernacular is used
to refer to those who are seeking shelter from some type of disaster in
a place other than their home. Even the farmers fleeing the dust bowl
in the 1930s, indelibly etched into the American memory by John
Steinbeck's Grapes of Wrath, were referred to as "refugees" by
newspapermen.4 ° It should not be surprising that in a country where
citizenship, rather than personhood, threatens to become the
demarcation line for the possession of rights, even basic human rights,
the use of the term "refugee" should be viewed by African-Americans
as something of a disparagement of their basic rights under the
American system of law. The question remains: Are those that see the
issue as one of citizenship really suggesting that only citizens were
entitled to rescue and humane treatment? We are facing this question
37.

See

MICHAEL ERIC DYSON, COME HELL OR HIGH WATER: HURRICANE

176 (2006); see also Michael Ignatieff, The
Broken Contract,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2005, Magazine, at 15.
38. See JOHN M. BARRY, RISING TIDE: THE GREAT MISSISSIPPI FLOOD OF 1927
AND How IT CHANGED AMERICA 184-86 (1997).
39. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 1-11; BARRY, supra note 38, at 184;
HORNE, supra note 4.
40. Frank J. Taylor, California'sGrapes of Wrath, FORUM, Nov. 1939, at 23238 reprintedin JOHN STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH: TEXT AND CRITICISM 457
(Peter Lisca & Kevin Hearle eds., 2d ed. 1997).
KATRINA AND THE COLOR OF DISASTER

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2006

11

California Western Law Review, Vol. 43 [2006], No. 1, Art. 3

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

today in the United States in a number of contexts, not just in terms of
our response to natural disasters. We owe it to ourselves and our
national consciousness to more thoroughly analyze and inform our
answers.
We need loans to rebuild. People who cannot afford to come back
on their own but who want to come back need assistance getting back.
We need coastal restoration efforts that address the damage that years
of natural gas and oil drilling have done to the Louisiana coast. 41
We need levees that work and that are maintained. We need an
evacuation plan that enables everyone in the area at risk to seek safe
haven. Over a million people evacuated the New Orleans area before
Katrina struck land. One hundred thousand, however, remained
behind.42 It is expensive to evacuate, and it is stressful. One has to
evacuate knowing that the storm may, at the last moment, veer off the
predicted path. What happens when the city is asked to evacuate
once, twice, three times during a hurricane season? How many of
those who evacuate the first time evacuate the third, if the first two
have been misses?
If it is a challenge for law professors
(accompanied by three dogs, a cat, and two kids) to evacuate more
than once a season, how will low-income or poor people handle it? If
the New Orleans area is to survive in the long-term, we need to come
up with a system that supports and facilitates evacuations in the face
of significant storms.
We have not gotten these things yet, and we face another
hurricane season come June 1. Is American efficiency a myth?
Where are the energy, imagination, will, and drive that made the
United States one of the earth's leading countries? Will we continue
to ignore the plight of the poor and to deny them basic dignity?
Storms don't discriminate on the basis of race, color, gender, or
wealth-but people and governments do.
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